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Core collections were once at the heart of 
assessment of a public library's ability to meet 
users' needs. The commitment to valuable public 
knowledge has receded over time based upon 
postmodern readings of what this concept might 
mean and a move toward a user-centred paradigm 
within LIS. Working within a knowledge 
organisation framework that problematises how 
users' definitions of value are assessed, this 
paper looks to how core collections can still have 
relevance within a framework of knowledge that 
has become increasingly context-laden and 
contingently based. The question of how value 
across domains is conceptualised and 
implemented is investigated with an aim to 
contribute to a hermeneutically-grounded method 
of selection that can aid users in finding the best 
materials to support self-guided learning. 
 This research aims to explicate why certain 
domains should be prioritised for civil society 
settings; what range and depth should be invoked 
in the process of selection and evaluation and 
what is the nature of subjective choice in 
delineating a balance between a core collection 
and the broader non-fiction collection. The 
research is grounded in hermeneutical 
phenomenology and a desire to see librarianship 
as, primarily, a human science, or at least a 
philosophically-informed humanistic endeavour. It 
looks to Betti's objectivist approach to 
interpretation of Geisteswissenschaften as a 
guide to understanding how library and 
information science balances one of its core 
assessment tasks: defining subject priority. This 
research outlines why scientific subjects should 
be apportioned a sublimated priority in civil 
society collections, but also that primarily the 
defining aspect of civil society collections is how 
they deal with the need to balance science, 
humanistic knowledge and the practical, technical 
and applied topicality that users require. The 
research reveals that the unravelling of these 
meta-categories is not as straightforward as 
might be supposed. 
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Introduction  
  The question of what are appropriate domains for a core 
non-fiction collection to meet the needs of users within a 
civil society setting has, to date, not received significant 
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attention from researchers, despite being among the 
foundational questions associated with librarianship. The 
normative nature of collections designed for unlimited 
growth, along with a warehousing model of information 
provision, ensured that such questions were more 
appropriate to issues of reference than with a circulating 
collection. 
  With a change in the reference paradigm associated with 
digital resources, and with the increasing need to justify  
selection decisions with reference to resource constraints, it 
has become increasingly necessary to ask how can civil 
society's libraries meet the needs of users for valuable 
knowledge and  what types of knowledge needs to be given 
the highest priority? Moving beyond simple demand-
oriented criteria into questions of axiology we should ask 
how librarians can create a framework for selection that is 
robust enough to answer the questions of civil society's 
users and how they might tread a path between the 
necessary subjectivity enabling them to meet local needs 
and disciplinary knowledge (the corpus of which  is often 
characterised as immutable or objective). 
The hermeneutic grounding of the problem  
  Gadamer explains how in Aristotle's formulation of 
“prohairesis,” the “formation of right convictions 
and...making right decisions” a distinction emerges 
between the scientific kind–“the mode of being known that 
depends on having proofs” and a moral version that is 
answerability or a type of respectful listening that is 
“participation in the superiority of a knowledge that is 
recognised to be authoritative...(and) allowing one's own 
convictions to be codetermined by another” (1999, p. 153). 
Gadamer posits  Aristotle as a salve to a prevailing world 
picture influenced by neo-Kantianism and its 
“epistemological methodologism” where questions of 
“what rationality really is, as it operates in the clarity of the 
practical life of humanity” (151) and in its expression as 
distinguished and fundamental knowledge, as “the 
theoretical rationality of science” (152) prevail. The balm, 
according to Gadamer, is Aristotle's “other kind of 
knowledge” that “life itself is concerned with,” the 
dianoetic virtues: techne, episteme, phronesis, nous and 
sophia; all “modes of knowing-being or securing the true.” 
Where this interpolates with collection theory is in how 
this kind of knowledge is proactive. Unlike “forms of 
knowing that are mere acceptance or viewpoint or opinion 
[and hence] cannot really be called knowing, because they 
admit error” this virtuous knowledge is sublime. Strictly 
speaking, where collection development fits the 
acquiescence criteria, it can be considered, at best, 
undeveloped. Gadamer highlights these dianoetic forms of 
knowing as reliable in contradistinction to mistaken or 
concealed knowledge.  
Gadamer outlines how hermeneutic insight helps to 
enable differentiation of philosophical text and literary 
artwork so as to avoid doxographic dogmatism. He does 
this with reference to Plato's “parts of the soul,” a doctrine 
that demonstrates “the unity of the soul in the plurality of 
its members and likewise the unity of the polis, where well-
being of the soul as well as that of the city depends on the 
harmony of voices” (ibid 154). Aristotle, according to 
Gadamer, creates an image of the human soul that “exists 
as one and presents itself as the one which it is in terms of 
its various possibilities” (ibid). These are interconnected, 
phronesis (practical wisdom) with ethos (character), as 
“aspects of the same basic constitution of humanity” (ibid 
155). With our (relatively) free choice we are left 
differentiating ethical and dianoetic virtues, and as Aristotle 
presaged, differentiating “knowledge involved in the 
phronesis that guides practice from the other forms of 
knowing where...theoretical knowledge or cognitively 
dominated production and manual skill are involved” 
(ibid).  
In his search for interpretative guidelines, or canons, that 
reveal “the hermeneutic autonomy of the object” (Betti, 
1980, 58) Betti looks to the notion that meaning (or sense) 
“should not be inferred but extracted” (Berzano 2012,80).  
Meaning-full forms have to be regarded as autonomous, 
and have to be understood in accordance with their own 
logic of development, their intended connections, and 
their necessity, coherence and conclusiveness; they 
should be judged in relation to the standards immanent in 
the original intention. (Betti, ibid) 
  The “coherence of meaning (principle of totality)” (ibid, 
p. 59), allows for clarity to be “achieved by reference either 
to the unity arising out of the ensemble of individual parts 
or to the meaning which each part acquires in respect of the 
whole”. This leads to an interdependence of signification 
and coherence, which in  
 a comprehensive totality can, in an objective reference, 
be conceived of as a cultural system which the work to be 
interpreted belongs to, inasmuch as it forms a link in the 
chain of existing continuities of meaning between works 
with a related meaning-content and expressive impulse. 
(ibid, p. 60) 
Bleicher (1980, p. 27) highlights how Betti considers the 
problematic relationship between perceiving mind and 
object through a process of “interpretation of meaning-full 
forms” (ibid, p. 28) to get to the difficult reality of 
objectivity and thereby “understanding in general” (ibid). 
Within the  setting of LIS there is a need to adjust the 
hermeneutic process that closely links author and 
interpreter according to Benediktsson (1989, p. 212), who 
also points to how the “objective of an interpretative 
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process is to arrive at contextual information, as opposed to 
atomized information” and the neglect of contextuality, 
which is a significant error.   
The meaning-inferring activity involved in this process is 
somewhat different to interpretation per se, it requires 
according to Betti, working within a framework of respect 
for the values of other people and doing justice to “the 
living community of minds” (ibid, p .71). It is 
eschatological but is not, for Betti, “beyond historical 
time”. According to this view, “history can never provide 
the framework around which eschatological events can 
crystallize; these events occur, in fact, within existence, 
which cannot be determined by reference to history alone” 
(ibid). Perrin's (1974) pared-back hermeneutic method, 
looks to Dilthey and Bultmann and works within the notion 
that  "die Kunstlehre des Verstehens schriftlich fixierter 
Lebensiusserungen (the art of understanding expressions of 
life fixed in writing)” is really a search for a general 
understanding of life; what remains may be a sign of 
finality or a symbol of experience, however so, the limits 
and means by which intensionality are exhausted beyond 
historical hermeneutic understanding lead to  interpreting 
this as “a conscious concern for relevance to and impact 
upon the interpreter and the interpreter's life” (ibid, p.5).  
The non-historical meaning-inference, that may express 
itself as a religious–or some other “continuing and specific 
encounter” (ibid, p. 72)–is not, and here Betti looks to 
Bultmann's consideration of this, inconsistent with “the 
quest for knowledge in the study of history”. What might 
result is a situation in which “knowledge of history and 
self-knowledge would correspond to one another”. They do 
this apparently through recognition of the nexus between 
human historicality and “responsibility towards the future” 
(ibid). 
  Betti asks us to toy with the idea that historicality is more 
than just the human interpretative capacity, it is 
“opportunity” and it links with self-knowledge and 
awareness of responsibility as qualities that enable the 
inference of meaning to take place. Betti (ibid, p. 73) cites 
Bultmann:  
In this kind of understanding the traditional opposition 
between the understanding subject and the object 
understood vanishes. Only as a participant and as...an 
historical Being can the historian understand history. In 
such understanding of history, man understands himself. 
Human nature cannot be grasped through introspection; 
instead, what man is can only be seen in history which 
reveals the possibilities of human existence through the 
wealth of historical creations. (1958, p. 139) 
  Betti is, however, just toying with such ideas to better 
refute them. They negate objectivity in such a way that 
shifts meaning to suppose that “the hermeneutical process 
of historical interpretation” corresponds with “situationally 
determined meaning-inference” (Betti, ibid). This would, in 
Betti's view, mistake “a condition for the possibility with 
the object of that process” and lead to the removal of the 
“canon of the hermeneutical autonomy of the object...from 
the work of the historian”. The self-satisficing nature of 
such an approach, which tempts through exegetical use of 
texts which only confirm already held opinions, needs to be 
balanced by a radical disclosure that allows that there may 
be, that there is, something within the text that “we could 
not know by ourselves and which exists independently of 
our meaning-inference” (ibid). The subjectivist position 
confounds interpretation and meaning-inference, and while 
eschatologically there are similarities, its “putting into 
doubt the objectivity of the result of interpretative 
procedures in all the human sciences” requires a 
demarcation of where objectivity might lie and how we 
“evidence...the epistemological conditions of its 
possibility” (ibid). 
 
Placing the knowledge organisation task 
within a civil society context  
Public (or civil society) libraries have changed in many 
parts of the world to such an extent that the mission to 
provide mutual support to afford expensive reading 
materials is  much diminished. What remains is a cultural 
relevance that is characterised by a  strongly civic and 
educational veneer. Working within this context, it is 
suggested that it is these characteristics which best 
represent the role that our public libraries now play. The 
only private libraries of consequence that remain are 
academic libraries and the collections in these are of little 
relevance, and of little temptation, to the vast majority of 
library users. It is for this reason that conceptualising civil 
society libraries, not for their public character nor for their 
openness to all, these are well-accepted facts, but for their 
civic and educational purpose creates a foundation to build 
collections that better fit the changed milieu. It is 
contended that the perceived need to meet demands for 
topicality, based upon either the model of the right of 
public access or the perception that all domain knowledge 
has an equal standing, is in need of revision. 
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If we place the civil society setting of the public library 
within a combined context of meanings (Roginsky & 
Shortall, 2009) which ranges from informal networks, 
through the so-called “third sphere” of non-state and non-
market activity and to a notion of a self-regulating 
universe, we are better placed to unravel the more 
legitimate questions that we are called upon to answer. 
While investigation of the civil society context of the 
public library have been made by scholars such as Kranich 
(2003), these do not look to elicit what kinds of domain 
knowledge fits a sector that  has interests outside of those 
of the state, the academy and the market but is reflective of 
broadly democratic and shared moral values? This 
conceptual research aims to provide preliminary findings to 
the questions of what among the numerous topical 
possibilities that might be represented in a civil society 
library, is indispensable, and why? 
 
Scientific knowledge in civil society libraries 
Both Saračević (1975) and Hjørland and Albrechtsen 
(1995) point to how the subject view of relevance plays a 
significant part in how we structure the lifeworld, in the 
communication of knowledge and in scientific method. 
Within the context of the civil society library scientific 
knowledge straddles a chasm between complexity and 
necessity. Complexity prohibits detailed treatment of any 
particular subject while, intrinsically for civic and 
educational purposes, some representation is needed.  
  When looking at how to conceptualise the collection that 
handles scientific knowledge the recompense offered for an 
adumbration of the depth of subject coverage is that this 
domain should always be accorded the first priority in any 
consideration of a core collection. While it is not necessary 
to outline in detail the benefits that accrue from scientific 
methodology and the philosophy of science, it will suffice 
to point to how scientific knowledge has an  important 
collateral role: “scientific disciplines can be regarded as 
social devices [facilitating]...the analysis and reduction of 
raw information to assimilated knowledge” (Garvey and 
Griffith, 1972, p.123). 
 
Contextualising the realm of non-scientific 
knowledge  
Creating concepts that fit into an elementary structuring 
of  knowledge is fraught with difficulty. Smiraglia and Van 
den Heuvel (2013, p. 61) outline how, despite this, the 
“validation of an elementary theory of knowledge 
interaction” should be attempted. Shifting focus to  
interaction, rather than organisation, allows us to see “how 
the nature and behavior of knowledge unities...formulate an 
alternative to a universal classificatory order, in order to 
create (temporary) interfaces that allow for interactions of 
knowledge” (ibid, p. 373). 
  For the purposes of civil society libraries it is proposed 
that a more appropriate approach to non-scientific 
knowledge can be outlined than the current diffuse system 
that is based on either classificatory or use-based criteria. 
In line with  Smiraglia and Van den Heuvel's direction to 
seek interaction as a useful guiding principle in how 
knowledge structures might be better conceived, a format 
that divides all non-scientific knowledge into either 
humanitas or techne is explained.  
  Humanitas as a concept allows the capture of a broader 
range of materials, subject areas and ideas than what we 
would ordinarily include in the concept of humanities. 
Tubbs (2014) points to how the concept broadly 
encompasses a recognition of a desire for self-knowledge–
it focuses more on the enculturing of the human being 
(bildung) and encompasses an applied literary, historical 
and philosophical inquiry in a way that humanities, with its 
encyclopaedic Aristotelian/Scholastic tendency is less 
oriented toward: humanitas might best be seen as a more  
ontologically-grounded expression of the humanities. 
Tubbs orients us to the break between the concepts as the 
separation of philosophy from the broader humanistic 
canon and how philosophy was able to fit in with the 
Scholastic pedagogic traditions of the lectura and the 
disputatio. The result was that “separated from philosophy, 
the humanities failed to retain their own philosophical unity 
and gradually fell apart into individual subject specialisms” 
(ibid, p. 491). 
  Techne is one of Aristotle's dionetic virtues and may be 
rendered as productive knowledge or art. The concept can 
be utilised as a means to marshal disparate subject 
knowledge into a taxonomy that allows semantic ordering 
to take place with reference to the structure of knowledge 
(in line with Smiraglia and Van den Heuvel's approach). It 
can do this in a way that is appropriate to a non-expert user 
cohort with potentially an unlimited range of topical 
information needs (as might reasonably be expected of a 
civil society library setting).  
  Utilising techne, in this sense, is not without precedent. 
Roochnik (1986) speaks of two kinds of techne as 
evidenced in Plato. Both productive and theoretical 
knowledge can be forms of techne. It is outlined in the 
current research as separate to scientific knowledge and 
humanitas, and as exemplifying a different modality. That 
modality is purposive action, and it is from this that we 
may take the central concern of the original concept and 
then apply it to a large set of classes of subject knowledge. 
Within this framework all that is not scientific knowledge, 
and that is not humanitas, is techne. To use a blunt 
example, Engineering uses Mathematics and Physics to 
create the ergon (work) of its technai (crafts), and would 
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not be included in our definition of scientific knowledge. 
The concept expands upon the notion of applied science 
and extends to all classes of knowledge that rest upon some 
measure of value, outside of epistemic claims to truth or 
measures of civic or moral virtue. The latter should not be 
narrowly construed as it encompasses, inter alia, a broad 
range of topicality through history, philosophy and literary 
exegesis. The concept of virtue acts on our subject 
topicality in the same way that moral philosophy implies 
both cognitive and ethical impetus. The issues arising are 
axiological in nature and contemplate both aesthetic and 
ethical (normative) considerations of value. 
 
Prioritising Humanitas as the core collection 
for civil society libraries 
  It is argued here that humanitas deserves to be placed at 
the centre of a civil society collection primarily because it 
is universal in its applicability to human Being and that it is 
relevant to the lifeworld of the individual just as it is to the 
society in which they live. This leads to the claim that as 
the most universally relevant subject knowledge, the 
subject knowledge that constitutes humanitas, should be 
accorded more significant treatment than techne. Within the 
circulating context of a civil society library this would 
mean that these materials are retained and replaced with 
greater certainty than items within the techne class. 
Similarly, greater semantic justification for their place in 
the collection would be needed. These works while not 
necessarily canonical, serve a similar purpose to a canon. 
While we may think of the works themselves as important, 
and in some cases they may be, they fit these axiological 
criteria only in so far as they represent the domain, 
topicality or subject that they sustain. 
  While humanitas is prioritised it must fit within a more 
catholic definition of materials selection that demands that 
all domain and topical representation is subsumed within 
the principle of subject range and depth, such that, the 
broadest horizon of topicality is of the most value to users. 
If implemented (and potentially it is already the undefined 
status quo), this principle would likely result in a collection 
that sees techne as the largest domain grouping represented. 
The implications for how humanitas might be treated are in  
the numbers of works for a subject area (the relevant 
topical range) and in the depth of treatment–both being 
provided for ad abundantiam. 
  The importance of humanitas subject knowledge, and the 
axiological nature of the topicality, demands that multiple 
treatments of similar subjects are integral to assessment of 
the comprehensiveness of a collection in ways that both 
scientific knowledge (with its limited comprehensibility to 
this type of user) and techne (with its limited relevance to 
any particular user) cannot claim. The somewhat arbitrary 
line between the Geistesswissenschaften and non-
scientifically oriented humanistic knowledge (and the 
relative ease of linguisticality as the medium of 
communication) would seem to demand that a 
precautionary principle to err on the side of complexity is 
implemented when dealing with humanitas materials 
selection.  
 
Core collections as remedies for 
bibliographic uncertainty 
Unifying the approach to subject  
When our notion of subject is itself problematical, when 
we debate “aboutness” so that it fits “one perfectly precise 
description” (Wilson, 1968, p. 71) rather than a multiplicity, 
and when we are unable to comprehend topicality that 
extends beyond simplistic precision, we are faced with the 
dilemma of dealing adequately with the subject when its 
essence is hardly straightforward but is, often, so broadly 
abstracted that neither theme nor thesis (as Wilson terms it 
after Monroe Beardsley) can reasonably be recognisable in 
a classificatory sense. 
 Wilson explores indirect reference as a somewhat 
bibliographical or subject-oriented equivalent to these 
notions and asks whether counting of concepts (in his focus 
it is identifying the subjects of writing) might equally be 
extensible into identifying the topicality of collections. 
While quantitative methods to define subject, or topicality, 
require the addition of an indirect focus on interpretation to 
be worthwhile (Wilson, ibid, p. 85), in order to move 
beyond a new ad hoc that we might resort to grouping–the 
always already familiar and natural–requires 
our ingenuity in finding ways of assembling groups, on 
our stock of available notions, on our ability to unify a 
writing [or a collection] by discovering or inventing a 
concept which all or much of the writing can be taken as 
exemplifying in one way or another. (ibid) 
To achieve manageability, Wilson invokes Cutter's notion 
of comprehensiveness as it pertains to generalisation of 
subject treatment. The difficulty of this is not lost on 
Wilson, he notes that “our notions of what is required for 
completeness are both exceedingly vague and subject to 
radical change” (ibid, p. 86). 
Looking to Barzun and Graff (1957) for inspiration, 
Wilson identifies the interpretive quality invoked when 
identifying subjects as “an appeal to unity” which 
manifests as “rules of selection and rejection”. Just as 
writers are faced with the task of seeking completeness, 
indispensability and necessity, such criteria also constitute 
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the conditions within which the essential subject is crafted. 
In searching for the essence of subject in writing, facticity 
and ideation emerge, not from a dominant theme, but from 
that by which “the presence of the rest can be explained”–it 
is that which provides the reason for the ancillary matters 
to be described which glues together the concept of a 
particular subject (Wilson, ibid, p. 87).  
Hjørland (2013) outlines how knowledge organisation 
(KO), which collection development planning interfaces 
with, requires an ontological commitment to uncovering 
the meaningful relations that emerge from concepts (ibid, 
p.1). The givenness of what we define as subjects and as 
classifications cannot be assumed, they emerge from the 
scholarly enterprise itself. This is associated with a pragma- 
tic  appreciation of the fallibilistic nature of knowledge 
which accepts it is both “tentative” and “provisional” (ibid, 
p. 2). It is connected, according to Hjørland, with the 
tendency for the degree of consensus within science to be 
overstated by those looking on from outside. Where 
consensus does not exist there will need to be a “decision 
based on an evaluation and negotiation of the different 
positions” which also will necessitate moving beyond a 
neutral position and favouring some positions over others 
(ibid). 
Hjørland highlights a point of difference between his and 
Feinberg's (2008) approaches to classification. While 
finding and describing is advanced by Feinberg, Hjørland 
is more of the view–using Feinberg's terminology–that 
defining and building is what domain classification entails 
(ibid, p. 3). Criteria recognition, when classifying or 
selecting materials, needs to allow for a set of parameters 
that are more than private criteria but are “derived from 
theories which tend to be publicly shared as 'paradigms' ” 
(ibid).   
Hjørland points to how knowledge organisation systems 
need to be “based on and related to current scientific 
theory” and that “no short cut via user studies, common 
sense or anything else” can be considered. Domains are not 
amenable to classification based solely upon theories of 
knowledge (e.g. a sociology of knowledge), according to 
Hjørland, the domain is the foundation for its own 
classification (and perhaps, its priority within a regime of 
collecting). Epistemology offers, according to Hjørland,   
the royal road to teach the relationship between information 
science and domain knowledge with many similar 
problems arising in the various array of domains studied. 
A general lesson from epistemology is that knowledge is 
created by humans for some specific purposes and serves 
some interests better than others. Concepts and semantic 
relations are not a priori or neutral, but should be 
examined in relation to their implications for the users 
they are meant to serve.  (ibid, p. 16) 
While knowledge organisation is substantially about 
classifying and indexing, it is also about applying these 
practices in order to achieve a result–as occurs in the 
development of a collection. While the tasks of 
classification and indexing, need to appreciate the operable 
paradigms within the domains in which they are working, 
theories of knowledge also apply (ibid, p. 9). It seems fair 
to advance the view that, howsoever domain paradigms and 
theories of knowledge apply to classification and indexing, 
they apply in more profound ways when developing and 
evaluating subject materials. Hjørland points to how 
“epistemologies are fundamental theories of KO” and also 
how these have developed somewhat separately to the user-
centred and cognitively-oriented theories that have become 
influential in information behaviour research. The reason is 
the fundamental document orientation of the KO task set 
(ibid, p. 9) 
The tendency to ask users is...a kind of positivism in 
which the empirical studies of users are considered better 
research than the scholarly studies of knowledge 
domains. The belief that cumulation of empirical data 
about users may in itself turn out to be useful for 
classification is...a problematic assumption related to 
empiricism. The user-based tradition thus represents one 
among other examples of how empiricism as a theory of 
knowledge has influenced KO. (ibid) 
Wilson highlights how, in the context of descriptive and 
exploitative bibliographic control, what matters more than 
subject is, in an instrumental sense, utility. The treatment of 
utility's associated concept, need, in bibliographic control, 
is a political factor and it can be established objectively 
through recourse to a more neutral language that is 
accommodating of “causes, capacities and consequences” 
(ibid, p. 153). This is though, effectively, “admitting a 
political claim  or demand for the amelioration of a 
situation...[for example that the] bibliographical 
instruments available to the one were fewer than those 
available to the other” (ibid). While the political questions 
of equality of subject access are straightforward, if not 
easily reconciled, Wilson points to how the real difficulty 
arises with “questions of adequacy that are neither purely 
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hypothetical or conditional, or purely questions of the 
degree of felt satisfaction” (ibid, p. 154) and it is these 
issues of knowledge organisation that press on us when 
trying to articulate a program for valuable public 
knowledge.  Tuominen (ibid, p. 353) describes how when 
our language (or by extension our collection) mirrors 
power relations we are left with a lack of real chance to see 
“other ways of being” (ibid). This intersects with the notion 
of simple use-demand metrics versus value-based selection 
methodologies: the former orient with institutionally-
defined subject representations, the latter with, ideally, 
notions of improvement and alternative explication of 
existing objects of study. 
Wilson's argument that all determinations of adequacy 
relating to bibliographic policy are inevitably political is 
somewhat obfuscatory. Wilson concedes that at the higher  
degrees of bibliographical control (ibid, p.115) the mastery 
of a body of texts bestows a felicitous ability to advise. 
This mastery, while constitutive of breadth and depth of 
learning, requires a mediatory quality to be deployed as 
well (ibid, pp. 115-117). In Two Kinds of Power, Wilson's 
conclusion that knowledge and its relationships and relative 
prioritisation is primarily political in character has an 
unintended consequence of imparting to knowledge 
organised in collections a subjective idealist character 
which is reductive. 
Contextualising subjectivity in subject selection 
Buckland (1995) was among the first to highlight the 
importance of value-based privileging in an era of digital 
availability. Demand-based decisions regarding local 
collections, while ever the flip side of value decisions, are 
according to this partitioning, ever more likely to be taken 
up, or absorbed, into the digital realm of networked 
resources. Buckland points to how collection development 
has a significant advisory role beyond this. 
The array of materials on the shelves can itself alert the 
reader to what is available, just as any bibliography or 
catalogue can. Certainly the array on the shelves is a 
selective, incomplete guide. It is limited to what has been 
added to that collection and, within that, is biased towards 
the less-popular material that happens to be on the 
shelves at any particular time. Nonetheless, a library 
collection plays an advisory role like that of a selective 
bibliography, drawing attention to material that has been 
identified as worth adding to the collection. Browsing 
books has some attraction over browsing in 
bibliographies or among catalog records. It is largely for 
this advisory role that the materials are arranged by a 
subject classification scheme. (ibid, p. 155-156) 
Working within the discourse analysis approach to LIS 
outlined by Frohmann (1994), Tuominen (1997) outlines a 
method that looks to uncovering how the identity of the 
user, as constructed by the library apparatus, creates a base 
line reference for how discourse, power and science as 
social practice develop. Tuominen's analysis is particularly 
useful in helping to explain how the representationalism 
inherent in scientific practice involves “the separation of 
the subject's inner world from external reality... [it acts as] a 
necessary prerequisite for the formation of objective  
knowledge” (ibid 352). At heart, this separation involves 
the conscious attempt to remain neutral and conceptualising 
facts as domiciled outside of language and thought in a 
space that is universally discoverable (ibid). What 
undermines such a view is a basic approach to 
epistemology and ontology that denies their separation: 
“the objects of knowledge cannot be separate from the 
accounts given of them, and...our understanding cannot be 
separated from the sociolinguistic practices through which 
it is achieved” (ibid).   
Hjørland's (2013) domain-analytic view of classification 
also reinforces the view that subject knowledge is crucial. 
Only through understanding competing paradigms and 
approaches and making choices about value can  
a classification [be] a subjective choice or negotiation 
between different views. The difference between a good 
and a bad classification is that the good classification 
reveals deep insight concerning the possible choices and 
dilemmas and is well argued (and has considered 
counterarguments, including potential counterarguments). 
(ibid, p. 14) 
Understanding the importance of subject–and subjective– 
representation in a collection involves coming to terms 
with how the use of language both enables and constrains 
the meaning, or sense-making, which we crave; it is also 
not separable from  the social practices that are locatable 
within the power relationships that constitute a society and 
its library. The relationship of the scientific life-form to the 
“generation and improvement of power mechanisms and 
resources” (Tuominen, ibid, p. 353) is not uncomplicated; 
the lack of clarity that, arguably, characterises how this is 
understood can be located in “a certain historically 
developed way of representing the object of the 
8 
study...considered to be self-evident [by the scholar], and 
thus without any reasonable alternatives” (ibid).  
By treating the important topicality that resides within 
humanitas in sufficient range and depth  such problems 
have the chance to be sufficiently contextualised, leading to 
a measure of resolution, resistance or re-evaluation. Core 
collections for civil society should look to challenging the 
evidentiary bases of knowledge claims. While they may not 
be equipped to fulfill this aim  in specific scholarly 
treatments, they can do so through selection practices in the 
advisory capacity that Buckland (ibid) has outlined.  When 
our civil society collections simply mirror the extant power 
relations or the naturalised subjectivity of the communities 
in which we live we are left with a lack of a real chance to 
see “other ways of being” (Tuominen (ibid, p. 353). This 
intersects with how use-demand metrics and value-based 
selection methodologies operate: the former orient with 
institutionally-defined subject representations, the latter 
with, ideally, notions of improvement and alternative 
explication of existing objects of study. 
 
Conclusion  
Public libraries operate within a specific civil society 
context that molds the way that  domain knowledge is 
represented. Various influences militate to expand and 
contract the range of subjects covered and the depth of their 
treatment. While the local civic culture that prefigures the 
collection is important, this should not be overstated. What 
has been suggested here is that greater focus should be 
placed on how core collections have a relevance beyond 
local particularities. The concept becomes valuable when it 
is  interpreted by librarians with reference to broader 
priorities about knowledge. Defining scientific knowledge, 
humanitas and techne as guiding principles allows for 
incorporating subjective  choice in ways that encourage 
eclecticism to thrive while also allowing relevance to retain 
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